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About This Book
Hinge epistemology is a rising trend in epistemology. Drawing on some of Wittgenstein’s ideas in On Certainty, it claims that knowledge always takes place within a system of assumptions, or “hinges”, that are taken for granted and are not subject to verification and control.
This volume brings together thirteen papers on hinge epistemology written by Annalisa Coliva, the coiner of the term and one of the leading figures in this trend, and published after her influential monographs Moore and Wittgenstein. Scepticism, Certainty and Common Sense (2010), Extended Rationality. A Hinge Epistemology (2015). By mixing together Wittgenstein scholarship and systematic philosophy, they illuminate the significance of hinge epistemology for current debates on scepticism, relativism, realism and anti-realism, as well as alethic pluralism, and envision its possible extension to the epistemology of logic.
Along the way, other varieties of hinge epistemology, such as Moyal-Sharrock’s, Pritchard’s, Williams’ and Wright’s are considered, both with respect to Wittgenstein scholarship and in their own right.
Reviews
“Over the last decade, the topic of hinge epistemology has become central to many key debates in epistemology. Annalisa Coliva’s work has played a seminal role in this welcome development. This timely book brings together the pioneering articles of Coliva on the interrelated topics of Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology, scepticism, relativism, and anti-realism. The book is essential reading both for those interested in the latest developments in epistemology and readers who wish to have a more in depth understanding of Wittgenstein and his last work, On Certainty.” — Maria Baghramian, School of Philosophy, University College Dublin, Ireland.
“Coliva is a careful and thorough scholar of Wittgenstein, as well as an epistemologist well-versed in the contemporary debates. The reader will learn much both from her discussion of Wittgenstein, as well from Coliva’s detailed elaboration of her own ‘extended rationality’ conception of perceptual warrant and its place in the contemporary epistemological landscape.” — Genia Schönbaumsfeld, Professor of Philosophy, University of Southampton, UK.
“This collection of essays by one of the pioneers of Hinge Epistemology situates and delineates the importance of Wittgenstein in mainstream epistemology. Professor Coliva’s expertise in both On Certainty and epistemology enables her to navigate between the two with depth and breadth, making unprecedented critical connections between the two, and giving both new lives.” — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Professor of Philosophy, President of the British Wittgenstein Society, University of Hertfordshire, UK.
“This volume brings together the rich and important body of recent work that Annalisa Coliva has written on hinge epistemology. It will be essential reading for anyone working in contemporary epistemology." — Duncan Pritchard, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, USA.
“I think her approach to Wittgenstein is distinctive and interesting, and certainly makes a useful contribution to the literature on him and on epistemology’. But that would read a bit clumsily as a blurb: I would be happy for you to recast this as ‘Coliva’s approach to her subject matter is distinctive and interesting, and she makes a very useful contribution to the literature both on Wittgenstein and on epistemology”. — Richard Gaskin, Professor of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, UK.
Author Information
Annalisa Coliva is Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Irvine.
Series
Anthem Studies in Wittgenstein
Table of Contents
Introduction; Acknowledgements; Credits; Part I In Quest of a Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology, Chapter One, Which Hinge Epistemology?; Chapter Two, Which Hinge Epistemology between Animal, Biscopic, and Constitutivist?; Chapter Three, “I Know,” “I Know,” “I Know”: Hinge Epistemology, Invariantism, and Skepticism; Chapter Four, Propositional and Doxastic Hinge Assumptions; Chapter Five, Are There Mathematical Hinges?; Part II Hinge Epistemology, Anti-Realism, and Relativism, Chapter Six, What Anti-realism About Hinges Could Possibly Be; Chapter Seven, Relativism and Hinge Epistemology; Chapter Eight, Was Wittgenstein an Epistemic Relativist?; Chapter Nine, Rituals, Philosophy, Science, and Progress: Wittgenstein on Frazer; Bibliography; Author Index; Subject Index
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