Examines British foreign policy and historiography surrounding the origins and consequences of the Great War, with particular attention to the work of George Peabody Gooch and Herbert Butterfield.
This work is a contribution to the conversation on the origins of the Great War of 1914–1918. The specific focus is on the contribution made by Gooch and Butterfield to the debate on the origins of the Great War, and especially the part played by Great Britain. It is argued that Germany was not solely, or even primarily, responsible for the outbreak of a general conflict in 1914 and that the perceived threat of Russia, her strength, potential, and intentions, not least in relation to the defence of the British Empire in the Indian sub-continent, was a key consideration for British policy makers down to and during the “July Crisis” of 1914.
It is also argued that although Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary in 1914, was not seeking war, the “understandings” that Great Britain then had with France, and Russia, robbed him of sufficient capacity to offer effective mediation between France and Russia on the one hand, and Germany and Austria-Hungary on another. Moreover, the roots of that incapacity lay also in policy changes effected in preceding decades, resulting in considerable British imperial over-extension, and a consequential inability to defend such a vast territory without entering into entangling de jure or de facto alliances.
This study is offered in the hope that it will encourage renewed attention to the work of George Peabody Gooch and Herbert Butterfield and further stimulate research and reflection into the roots and consequences of British policy in July 1914.
