Iron Pyrite

Challenges Kripkean orthodoxy; develops Wittgensteinian alternatives in logic, language, and metaphysics; and reassesses fundamental philosophical views.

Iron Pyrites critiques ideas developed or assumed by Kripke, central to analytic philosophy for over half a century. The critical discussion also develops alternative philosophical views on logic, language, metaphysics, and philosophy generally, characterized by a Wittgensteinian approach.

Ben-Yami critiques Kripke’s concept of rigidity, revising it in the process. He rejects the “causal”-communication picture of names, arguing for a different view of name use. Identity is shown to be contingent, on logical and conceptual grounds, as is the origin of people and things. The meaning of kind terms is independent of any unknown essence. All proposed examples of necessary a posteriori knowledge are invalidated, and the concept of metaphysical necessity is shown to be empty. Talk of fictional characters is not committed to their existence in any form, abstract or other. The notion of speaker’s reference, as contrasted with semantic reference, is incoherent. Kripke’s approach to the liar paradox is shown to be misguided, and an alternative resolution of the paradoxical situation is provided. Wittgenstein’s views on rule-following a and on meaning something by a word are reinterpreted and endorsed. The principle of non-contradiction, assumed by Kripke and most other philosophers, is in fact a dateable decision on an optional mode of description. And the notion of the mathematical infinite is reconsidered, showing that different infinities differ not in size but in orderliness.
Accompanied by methodological reflections, a Wittgensteinian view of logic, language, metaphysics, and philosophy emerges. Philosophical discoveries and innovations often reflect confusion and misunderstanding, and real achievement lies in returning to the point we were before being misled. The gold promised was fool’s gold.